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MOVING BEYOND LASSITER: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR PARENTS IN CHILD
WELFARE CASES
Vivek S. Sankaran†

INTRODUCTION
In New York City, an indigent parent can receive the assistance of a
multidisciplinary legal team—an attorney, a social worker, and a parent advocate1—
to defend against the City’s request to temporarily remove a child from her care.2
But in Mississippi, that same parent can have her rights to her child permanently
terminated without ever receiving the assistance of a single lawyer.3 In Washington
State, the Legislature has ensured that parents ensnared in child abuse and neglect
proceedings will receive the help of a well-trained and well-compensated attorney
with a reasonable caseload.4 Yet in Tennessee, its Supreme Court has held that
although a parent may technically have a right to a lawyer, that lawyer need not be
effective.5
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a parent’s right
to direct the care of her child is one of the oldest and most fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution.6 How that right is safeguarded, however, when the
State seeks to strip a parent of that right—either temporarily or permanently—can
vary significantly. Over twenty-five years ago, in Lassiter v. Department of Social
† Vivek S. Sankaran is a clinical professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School, where he
directs the Child Advocacy Law Clinic and Child Welfare Appellate Clinic.
1 A parent advocate, also known as a parent partner or peer mentor, is a parent who was previously
involved with the child welfare system but who successfully reunified with his or her child. That parent now
serves as a mentor for other parents currently experiencing the child welfare system. For more information
about parent advocates, see Diane Boyd Rauber, From the Courthouse to the Statehouse: Parents as Partners
in Child Welfare, 28 ABA CHILD L. PRACTICE 145, 150–56 (2009).
2 Several New York City legal organizations provide parents with a multidisciplinary legal team.
Examples include the CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, www.cfrny.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); BROOK.
DEFENDER SERVICES, www.bfdp.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); and BRONX DEFENDERS,
https://www.bronxdefenders.org/our-work/family-defense-practice/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
3 MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(2) (2017) (“[T]he youth court judge may appoint counsel to represent
the indigent parent or guardian in the proceeding.”) (emphasis added).
4 Information about the Washington State Office of Public Defense, Parent Representation Project is
available at WASH. ST. OFF. OF PUB. DEF., http://www.opd.wa.gov/index.php/program/parents-representation
(last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
5 In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 44 (2016).
6 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
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Services,7 the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to create uniformity
in how states protect the right to parent. It refused to do so, instead finding that
parents do not have an absolute constitutional right to counsel in termination of
parental rights (“TPR”) cases.8 Since then, state legislatures and state courts have
defined under what circumstances parents should receive the assistance of counsel.
While some states require the appointment of lawyers before the court can remove a
child from her parent, others delay the appointment to the TPR stage, which may be
years after a child has already been placed in foster care. By then, the outcome of
the case may be preordained due to the series of interim decisions leading up to the
TPR hearing. Even worse, a few permit courts to terminate parental rights without
ever appointing counsel for a parent. And in many, the ability to receive the
assistance of an effective lawyer depends on the funding whims of the legislature,
which can quickly change during a budgetary crisis. While some legislatures have
shown an interest in strengthening parent representation,9 many have not. So long as
Lassiter remains binding precedent—which there is no reason to believe will change
anytime soon—appellate courts will be ill-equipped to address the significant
disparity between how states provide the right to counsel for parents.
But another previously unexplored avenue for redress exists. Since the mid1970s, the Federal Government has sought to create uniformity in how states
administer child welfare systems to achieve basic goals for children, including
preventing unnecessary removals, reunifying families quickly, and if they cannot go
home, expediting their placement into another permanent home.10 Various pieces of
federal legislation, including the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,11 the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act,12 and the Adoption and Safe Families
Act,13 have required states to implement uniform procedures within their child
welfare systems in exchange for receiving federal funds. Using this authority, among
other things, Congress has required child welfare agencies to provide services to
families prior to removing children from their homes,14 mandated that agencies
develop case plans to reunify children with parents,15 and directed states to provide
children the assistance of guardians ad litem in every case.16 To ensure compliance
7 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
8 Id. at 31–32.
9 For example, in Utah, the legislature has included parent representation within the scope of its Indigent
Defense Commission, which is primarily focused on strengthening legal representation for defendants in
criminal cases. More information about the Commission can be found at UTAH INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N,
https://justice.utah.gov/indigent-defense.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
10 EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42794, CHILD WELFARE: STATE PLAN REQUIREMENTS
UNDER THE TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP PROGRAM 5–6,
11 (2012).
11 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012).
12 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
13 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
14 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
15 § 671(a)(16).
16 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2012) (requiring the governor of each state to assure that the state
has procedures that “in every case involving a victim of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial
proceeding, a guardian ad litem, who has received training appropriate to the role, including training in early
childhood, child, and adolescent development, and who may be an attorney or a court appointed special advocate
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with these federal mandates, the Administration of Children and Families (“ACF”)
regularly conducts audits of child welfare systems in which it identifies areas where
states are failing to follow federal standards, and seeks corrective actions, including
the potential loss of federal funds. These federal requirements drive how states’ child
welfare systems operate.
In exchange for complying with these federal mandates, the Federal Government
provides states with billions of dollars to administer their child welfare systems.17
Generally speaking, federal monies can be used to pay for limited prevention
programs, fund the salaries of agency caseworkers, and pay subsidies for foster
parents, adoptive parents, and relative guardians.18 Additionally, states can use
federal funds to pay for attorneys who represent child welfare agencies,19 adoptive
parents, and relatives seeking a guardianship.20 But the ACF has interpreted federal
law to prohibit federal funds from being used to pay for attorneys who represent birth
parents,21 implicitly stating that parents’ lawyers are not necessary for the proper and
efficient administration of the foster care system, the required finding for states to
receive administrative funds related to foster care under Title IV-E of the Social
Security Act.22
Recently, however, the ACF issued a powerful and detailed policy memorandum
contradicting its own position, calling for states to provide parents with “high
quality” counsel “at or before the initial court appearance in all cases.”23 In fact, in
the memorandum, the ACF concluded that the lack of competent legal counsel was a
“significant impediment to a well-functioning child welfare system.”24 This is
unsurprising given the research demonstrating that strong parent representation
furthers the policy goals of both child welfare agencies and the Federal
Government.25 Yet despite its strong language, the memorandum lacked a critical
piece—specific actions the Federal Government would actually take to ensure that
parents in every state receive the effective assistance of counsel. Most importantly,
who has received training appropriate to that role (or both), shall be appointed to represent the child in such
proceedings – (I) to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the child; and (II) to
make recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the child.”).
17 See CAL. ADVOCATES FOR CHANGE, CHILD WELFARE FINANCING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF
FLEXIBILITY AND THE NEED FOR NEW RESOURCES 2–5 (2016) (providing an overview of federal child welfare
financing).
18 Id. at 4.
19 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
WELFARE POLICY MANUAL 8.1B Question 18, available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=36.
20 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(6) (2012); See also § 673(d)(1)(B)(iv).
21 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 19.
22 Under 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c) (2016), states may claim reimbursement for “administrative
expenditures necessary for the proper and efficient administration” of the foster care system.
23 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 17-02, at 1, 13 (2017).
24 Id. at 2.
25 See Vivek S. Sankaran, Patricia L. Rideout & Martha L. Raimon, Strange Bedfellows: How Child
Welfare Agencies Can Benefit From Investing in Multidisciplinary Parent Representation, (Ctr. for the Study
of Soc. Polic’y 2015), https://www.cssp.org/reform/child-welfare/strange-bedfellows-how-child-welfareagencies-benefit-from-multidisciplinary-parent-represenation.pdf (documenting ways in which good parent
representation helps child welfare agencies).
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the memorandum failed to specify any federal funding which would allow states to
strengthen the representation of birth parents.
This Article seeks to fill that void and proposes specific steps that the Federal
Government must take. It argues that Congress should include—among its existing
conditions for states to receive federal child welfare funds under Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act—an explicit requirement that states provide parents with the
assistance of counsel at the first court proceeding in every child welfare case. To
support the implementation of this requirement, both Congress and the ACF should
make clear that states can use federal child welfare funds under Title IV-E to pay for
parents’ counsel, a directive perfectly consistent with the plain language of the
current law. Additionally, in addition to clarifying that Title IV-E funds can be used
to support parent representation, the ACF should invite states to submit proposals for
the Title IV-E demonstration project waiver program—if Congress reauthorizes the
program—that focus on parent representation.26 Taking these steps would
dramatically improve the legal representation that parents receive when their
fundamental rights are jeopardized and would create much needed uniformity across
the country. An indigent parent’s ability to protect a fundamental constitutional right
will no longer vary depending on her misfortune of living in a particular state.
Part One of this Article provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of a parent’s fundamental right to raise her child, the ways in which civil
child welfare proceedings impact that right, and how Lassiter has created an
insurmountable roadblock to achieve uniformity in the appointment of counsel for
parents through litigation. Part Two highlights the moral, social, and economic costs
created by the disuniformity and argues that it serves the policy interests of both the
Federal Government and child welfare agencies to address it. Part Three explains
how Congress has used federal laws to create standard practice in the administration
of state child welfare proceedings and argues that both Congress and the ACF must
take steps to strengthen parent representation across the country because such
representation is an essential component of a functioning foster care system.

I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF PARENT REPRESENTATION FAILS TO PROTECT
A PARENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIRECT THE UPBRINGING OF
HER CHILD

For nearly a century, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a parent’s right to
direct the care, custody, and control of her child from unnecessary interference by

26 The Title IV-E Waiver Demonstration Program allowed states to request permission from the Federal
Government to spend child welfare funds received under Title IV-E of the Social Security Acts for a broad
range of purposes. Typically, these funds are spent to pay for expenses related to a child’s stay in foster care.
More information about the program can be found at CHILDREN’S BUREAU, OFFICE FOR THE ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
CHILD WELFARE WAIVERS (last
visited
Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/programs/child-welfare-waivers.
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the State.27 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has struck down state statutes infringing
upon a parent’s right to choose a school for her child,28 to determine what language
a child can learn in school,29 and to decide whether a child can visit with
grandparents.30 In each of these cases and others, the Court has safeguarded the
fundamental right of parents to raise their children absent compelling
circumstances.31
The most severe way for the State to infringe upon a parent’s right to direct the
care of her child is for the State to strip a parent of that right through a civil child
welfare proceeding. In these proceedings, after conducting an investigation, the State
can file a petition alleging that the parent has abused or neglected her child and
requesting an order that the court take control over the child to make decisions about
where the child should live. The court can determine what services should be
provided to the family to remedy the maltreatment, and if removed, when the child
should return home.32 If the allegations are proven, the court can monitor the family,
order the child welfare agency to provide services to remedy the maltreatment, and
ultimately determine where the child’s permanent home should be. In extreme
circumstances, the court can terminate the rights of the parent, a drastic remedy
characterized by appellate courts as the “civil death penalty.”33 After a parent’s rights
are terminated, all legal ties between the child and his parent are extinguished.
Due to the severe sanctions courts can impose on parents in child welfare
proceedings, the Supreme Court has sought to ensure that these proceedings
adequately protect the procedural due process rights of parents. For example, in
Stanley v. Illinois,34 the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to require that
the State demonstrate that a parent is unfit prior to placing his or her child in foster
care.35 And in Santosky v. Kramer,36 the Court held that the Constitution required
the State to demonstrate that a parent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence
before permanently terminating a parent’s rights.37 In both decisions, the Court
recognized the sanctity of the parent-child relationship and the unique ways in which

27 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
28 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
29 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
30 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
31 But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (affirming state law prohibiting parents
from forcing children to work under certain conditions).
32 For a detailed overview of the steps in a civil child welfare proceeding, see Ann M. Haralambie &
Donald N. Duquette, A Child’s Journey Through The Child Welfare System, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE 419 (3d ed. 2016).
33 In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004); In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. App. 2002); In
re K.D.L., 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002).
34 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
35 Id. at 649.
36 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
37 Id. at 769 (holding that, in cases involving Indian children, the Indian Child Welfare Act requires the
State to prove grounds for termination of parental rights beyond a reasonable doubt). See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)
(1978).
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civil child welfare cases threatened that right. Thus, the Court prescribed procedures
to ensure that the State was not erroneously infringing upon the right.
Despite the Court’s strong recognition of the procedural due process rights of
parents in child welfare cases, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,38 the
Court retreated. In Lassiter, the Court had the opportunity to create a straightforward
rule to ensure that all parents receive a basic protection—the right to a lawyer—
before a court could terminate their parental rights. The Court declined to do so.
Instead, while recognizing the crucial role that parent’s counsel play in termination
of parental rights cases, the Court ultimately gave trial courts the discretion to
determine—on a case-by-case basis—whether the Constitution required the
appointment of counsel.39 The Court concluded, “[We] leave the decision whether
due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court.”40 But the Court
still recognized that “wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards
be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution” and that
“[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the
assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but also
in dependency and neglect proceedings as well.”41 Nevertheless, it refused to
interpret the Constitution to require the absolute appointment of counsel for parents
in every case.
Commentators quickly criticized the Court’s holding in Lassiter. Anthony
Trombley noted, “[i]t is curious that the Court considers a one-day jail sentence to be
more intrusive on liberty than a lifelong revocation of the parental right to the care,
custody, and companionship of a child.”42 Trombley also observed that Lassiter
failed to provide guidance for state courts or any articulated standards and that “[a]d
hoc determinations . . . will likely lead to inconsistent protection of procedural due
process rights.”43 Similarly, Douglas Besharov warned that Lassiter “may lead state
legislatures and state courts to conclude that indigent parents do not need—or do not
deserve—legal representation.”44 In his words, “Lassiter, for all practical purposes,
stands for the proposition that a drunken driver’s night in the cooler is a greater
deprivation of liberty than a parent’s permanent loss of rights in a child.”45
In many ways, in the three decades after Lassiter, the inconsistency and
disuniformity predicted by Trombley has borne out. In at least six states, statutes and
court rules give courts wide discretion whether to appoint counsel for parents, even
at the TPR stage. For example, in Delaware, courts have discretion to determine
whether the request for counsel is “appropriate,” considering the degree to which the

38 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
39 Id. at 31–32.
40 Id. at 32.
41 Id. at 33–34.
42 Anthony Trombley, Alone Against the State: Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 15 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1123, 1136–37 (1982).
43 Id. at 1140–41.
44 Douglas Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Counsel after Lassiter
v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L. Q. 205, 219 (1982).
45 Id. at 221.
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loss of parental rights are at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those rights,
and the interest of the State.46 Similarly, in Mississippi, the statute simply asks courts
to determine “whether the parent is entitled to appointed counsel under the
Constitution of the United States, the Mississippi Constitution . . . or statutory law.”47
Likewise, in Nevada, the statute does not require the appointment of counsel but
instructs courts that they “may” appoint one.48 Three other states have similar
frameworks.49 In these jurisdictions, it is entirely possible for a parent to have their
rights terminated without ever having received the assistance of a lawyer.
Not only do several states deny parents the right to counsel at the TPR stage,
many more—at least eleven—fail to guarantee parents the right to counsel at earlier
stages of the child protective proceeding, where critical decisions are made as to
whether the State can remove a child from her home.50 In most of these jurisdictions,
statutes and court rules leave the appointment of counsel within the complete
discretion of the trial court. For example, in Minnesota, the court must only appoint
counsel when “it feels that such an appointment is appropriate.”51 In Missouri, the
court may give the parent an attorney only if it determines that “a full and fair hearing
46 DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 206(a)(b).
47 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-113(2)(b) (2017). See also J.C.N.F. v. Stone Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
996 So. 2d 762, 772 (Miss. 2008) (finding that the trial court did not err in denying counsel to an indigent
parent); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907, 910 (2000) (noting that
“appointment of counsel in termination proceedings, while wise, is not mandatory”).
48 NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100(3) (2016). See also In re N.D.O., 115. P.3d 223, 225 (Nev. 2005) (finding
that “no absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada.”).
49 See MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(c) (2017) (court may appoint counsel “in any case in which it feels
that such an appointment is appropriate”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 5232(3) (2017) (court may appoint counsel
“when the court deems the interests of justice require representation”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-318(a) (2017)
(“The court may appoint counsel for any party who is indigent”).
50 DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 206(a) (court “may” appoint counsel during the parent’s initial appearance);
MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(c) (2017) (court may appoint counsel “in any case in which it feels that such an
appointment is appropriate.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(2) (2017) (“[T]he youth court judge may appoint
counsel to represent the indigent parent or guardian in the proceeding.”) (emphasis added); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.211(4) (2016) (court shall appoint counsel only if it finds: “(1) [t]hat the custodian is indigent; and (2)
[t]hat the custodian desires the appointment of counsel; and (3) [t]hat a full and fair hearing requires appointment
of counsel for the custodian”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.420(1) (2016) (“[T]he court may appoint an attorney
to represent the person.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-306(A)(1)(a) (2016) (“[C]ounsel may be appointed by
the court at the emergency custody hearing.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.205(1) (2015) (“Counsel shall be
appointed for the parent or legal guardian whenever the nature of the proceedings and due process so require.”);
TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 5 § 107.013(a) (West 2017) (counsel only required when “termination of the parent-child
relationship or the appointment of a conservator for a child is requested”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 5306(d)(5)
(2017) (“The attorney may be Court-appointed in the event the parent is eligible . . . .”). Wisconsin has no
statute allowing trial courts to appoint counsel for parents prior to the termination of parental rights hearing, but
its Supreme Court has ruled that courts must have the discretion to appoint counsel when necessary. See Joni
B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411, 417–18 (Wis. 1996) (“We emphasize that the key to an individualized
determination is that the need to appoint counsel will differ from case to case. In other words, a circuit court
should only appoint counsel after concluding that either the efficient administration of justice warrants it or that
due process considerations outweigh the presumption against such an appointment.”). And Virginia appoints
counsel at the initial removal hearing but does not require that counsel remain on the case during the postdispositional stage when the parent is trying to reunify with his or her child in foster care. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-266(D) (2017) (“Prior to a hearing at which a child is the subject of an initial foster care plan filed
pursuant to § 16.1-281, a foster care review hearing pursuant to § 16.1-282 and a permanency planning hearing
pursuant to § 16.1-282.1, the court shall consider appointing counsel to represent the child’s parent or
guardian.”).
51 MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(c) (2017).
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requires appointment of counsel.”52 Oregon law asks that the court consider various
factors to ascertain whether counsel is actually needed including the following:
(a) [t]he duration and degree of invasiveness of the interference with the
parent-child relationship that possibly could result from the proceeding;
(b) [t]he complexity of the issues and evidence; (c) [t]he nature of
allegations and evidence contested by the parent or legal guardian; and (d)
[t]he effect the facts found or the disposition in the proceeding may have
on later proceedings or events, including but not limited to termination of
parental rights or criminal proceedings.53

The common thread in these statutory schemes is that the appointment of counsel
is permissive. That is, parents in these jurisdictions may have their children taken
from them and placed in foster care without ever having received the assistance of a
lawyer.
Not only does variance exist among states as to when, or if, counsel must be
appointed to represent parents; it also exists as to the adequacy of that lawyer.
Certainly, in some jurisdictions across the country, courts appoint high quality, wellfunded and properly trained attorneys to represent parents.54 Some even afford
parents the assistance of a social worker and a parent advocate, who are members of
the multidisciplinary legal team.55 The past decade has seen significant progress in
the increase of highly specialized parent representation.
But this is the exception, not the norm. In many jurisdictions, parents’ lawyers
still get paid very little,56 receive inadequate training,57 and carry high caseloads.58
Numerous states place the burden on funding parent representation on counties, and
as such, the amount attorneys get paid—and how they get paid—can even vary within

52 MO. REV. STAT. § 211.211(4) (2016).
53 OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.205(1) (2015).
54 See Elizabeth Thornton & Betsy Gwin, High-Quality Legal Representation for Parents in Child
Welfare Cases Results in Improved Outcomes for Families and Potential Cost Savings, 46 FAM. L. Q. 139, 140
(2012) (describing work of high quality parent representation offices across the country).
55 Id. at 141 (describing multidisciplinary practice).
56 Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings:
The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 265 (1997) (“Even where the appointment of counsel
is mandated, there may be nonexistent or limited provisions for paying those lawyers . . . .”). Young correctly
observed that a “[l]ack of remuneration may limit the number of attorneys willing to accept parental rights case
[sic], or their enthusiasm for those cases they do undertake”). Astra Outley, Representation for Children and
Parents in Dependency Proceedings, 8 (Pew Charitable Trs., 2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/reports/2004/06/01/representation-for-children-and-parents-in-dependency-proceedings. (“The perception within the legal community is that the pay for parent’s attorney is at a level too low to allow for effective
representation. Of the court improvement specialists interviewed for the NCJFCJ Project, 75% believed that
attorneys for parents were not adequately compensated.”).
57 See ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM PARENT ATTORNEY
SURVEY RESULTS 2 (2011) [hereinafter “COURT IMPROVEMENT SURVEY”] (noting that in at least nineteen
states, there are no training requirements for parents’ attorneys prior to receiving a case, and that in at least
twenty-eight, there are no standards of practice).
58 See id. at 5 (noting that at least thirty states do not limit the caseloads of parents’ lawyers).
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a state.59 And during times of budget crises, legislatures have sought to cut funding
for parent representation.60 Additionally, many attorneys who practice in this field
are solo practitioners, and thus receive no institutional support for their work.61
Unsurprisingly, many parents, judges and other stakeholders have publicly
criticized the lack of quality of parents’ counsel.62 The Vera Institute for Justice
found that over twenty-seven percent of parents said their attorney was unhelpful.63
Nearly eleven percent reported never meeting the attorney.64 More than a third of
those with attorneys did not know for whom their attorney worked.65 Even attorneys
conceded the significant disincentives to engage in zealous advocacy. A 2004 report
by the Spangenberg Group observed that “[a] number of attorneys candidly admitted
that there is disincentive to do all that could be done when representing a parent in
abuse and neglect cases because of the fee ceiling.”66 Consistent with this, a 2005
report by the Muskie Institute and the American Bar Association noted that parents’
lawyers in Detroit “meet in the cafeteria and deal the morning’s cases like cards,
trading cases back and forth based on who is going to be in which courtroom that

59 See id. at 6 (noting that at least seventeen states have a county-based funding system). The survey also
noted that in the forty-eight states whose stakeholders responded to the survey, there were eighty-one different
types of funding schemes to pay parents’ lawyers.
60 See, e.g., Dan Gorenstein, N.H. Parents on Their Own In Abuse, Neglect Cases, N.H.P.R. (April 2,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/02/149846261/n-h-parents-on-their-own-in-abuse-neglect-cases (describing budget cuts to parent representation in New Hampshire); Elizabeth Stawicki, Public Defenders to Stop
Representing Poor Parents in Child Protection Cases, MPR NEWS, July 3, 2008, available at
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/07/03/who_will_pay (reporting that due to budget cuts, the public
defender agency decided to stop representing parents in child protection cases).
61 See COURT IMPROVEMENT SURVEY, supra note 57, at 10 (noting that at least twenty-four states did not
give parents’ attorneys access to social workers to assist them in their cases).
62 See, e.g., MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV., CUTLER INST. FOR CHILD AND FAMILY ‘POLICY & ABA,
MICHIGAN COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT REASSESSMENT 155 (2005) [hereinafter “MICHIGAN COURT
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT”], available at http://courts.mi.gov/administration/sc-ao/resources/documents/publications/reports/cipaba-reassess.pdf; Outley, supra note 56, at 7 (“Regardless of whether and at what
point counsel is appointed, much of the time the representation is inadequate for varied reasons.”); Editorial,
Giving Overmatched Parents a Chance, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1996, at A14 (“Parents who are about to lose
their children because of abuse or neglect are often at a legal disadvantage. Welfare authorities have the legal
muscle of the city behind them. The children are generally represented by an experienced Legal Aid lawyer
with a support network of social workers. But the parents are generally stuck with harried court-appointed
lawyers who are juggling many cases, and who often show up unprepared and late for hearings. . . . [T]hese
lawyers are often not up to the task. Many meet their clients for the first time just before rushing into court.
They know nothing of the family’s background and often cannot speak the parents’ language.”).
63 Julia Vitullo-Martin & Brian Maxey, New York Family Court: Court User Perspectives 15 (Vera Inst.
of Justice 2000), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/new-york-familycourt-court-user-perspectives/legacy_downloads/nyfamilycourt.pdf. See also Ann Moynihan, Mary Ann
Forget & Debra Harris, Symposium: Fordham Interdisciplinary Conference: Achieving Justice: Parents and
the Child Welfare System, Foreword, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 330 (2001) (recounting the following story
from a parent: “When I arrived at court that morning, I was told this is my lawyer. My lawyer sat down with
me five minutes, asked me a couple of things, and told me to admit to my drug addiction. I didn’t know anything
about a fact-finding hearing. I wasn’t told what my rights were. I wasn’t told the procedure of court. I didn’t
have any idea what was happening, and I was very much afraid, because the most important thing in my life
had just been lost.”).
64 Vitullo-Martin & Maxey, supra note 63.
65 Id.
66 SPANGENBERG GRP., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 54–55 (2004).
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day.”67 The report concluded that “[w]hat was reported to evaluators . . . and what
was observed at court hearings falls disturbingly short of standards of practice.”68
These observations typify what is well known to anyone in the field—that the lack
of quality parent representation remains a blight on our child protection system.69
Three decades ago, Professor Martin Guggenheim correctly noted that child
protection “is the only area of law in which the party most in need of effective
assistance of counsel is least likely to obtain it.”70 His words still ring true today. It
is beyond dispute that the state of parent representation remains in disarray over
thirty-five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter. This leads to two
related questions: 1) why should we care and 2) what can we do about it? The next
section explores these issues.
II. INADEQUATE PARENT REPRESENTATION UNDERMINES JUSTICE, HARMS
CHILDREN, AND WASTES MONEY, BUT LASSITER PREVENTS A REMEDY
THROUGH THE COURTS
The failure of child welfare systems to provide parents with adequate legal
representation undermines our sense of justice, thereby reducing the likelihood that
parents will cooperate with the very systems looking to reunify their children with
them. It also harms children and wastes public funds. For these reasons, investing
in parent representation serves the policy interests of both the Federal Government
and child welfare agencies.
As noted at the outset of this Article, child protective proceedings involve the
use of the State’s parens patriae power to involuntarily remove a child from his or
her home. More often than not, parents involved in these proceedings are poor, lack
education, and may suffer from mental health conditions. Additionally, the ability of
parents to think cogently may also be affected by the trauma the parents themselves
67 MICHIGAN COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, supra note 62, at 153 (internal quotations omitted).
68 Id. at 155.
69 Numerous statewide reports have confirmed these findings. Within the last decade, reports from
Michigan, Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina and Wyoming have all documented the challenges faced by
parents’ attorneys, including high caseloads, inadequate compensation and a lack of training, among other
things. See ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS IN CHILD
WELFARE PROCEEDINGS: A PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN PRACTICE (2009), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_the_law/parentrepresentation/michigan_parent_representation_report.authcheckdam.pdf; OR. TASK FORCE ON DEPENDENCY
REPRESENTATION, FINAL REPORT (2016) available at
http://www.oregon.gov/gov/policy/Documents/LRCD/Oregon_Dependency_Representation-_TaskForce_Final_Report_072516.pdf; NAT’L. CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, COLORADO COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM RESPONDENT PARENTS’ COUNSEL TASK FORCE
STATEWIDE
NEEDS
ASSESSMENT:
FINAL
REPORT
(2007),
available
at
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Committees/Court_Improvement/CORPCFinalNeedAsstReptApp.pdf; ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LEGAL REPRESENTATION
FOR PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS: A PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA
PRACTICE
(2013)
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/ParentRep/NorthCarolinaReport_full.authcheckdam.pdf; ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAW, LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS: AN ANALYSIS OF WYOMING
PRACTICE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/wyolegalrep.authcheckdam.pdf.
70 Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in
Poverty and the Role Of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2310 (1998).
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have experienced, either as children or as adults.71 Consequently, these parents are
among the least likely of individuals to be able to defend themselves on their own
and to articulate to a court why their children should be returned to their care.72 These
are also the very parents that the system must work with to achieve its primary goal
of reunification.
In contrast, the State has a vast array of resources to prosecute a child welfare
case, including trained lawyers and caseworkers, access to records about the family,
and the availability of investigatory tools. The Supreme Court described this vast
resource disparity in its decision in Santosky v. Kramer. The Court stated:
The State’s ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the
parents’ ability to mount a defense. No predetermined limits restrict the
sums an agency may spend in prosecuting a given termination proceeding.
The State’s attorney usually will be expert on the issues contested and the
procedures employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys full access to
all public records concerning the family. The State may call on experts in
family relations, psychology, and medicine to bolster its case.
Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency’s own
professional caseworkers whom the state has empowered both to
investigate the family situation and to testify against the parents. Indeed,
because the child is already in agency custody, the State even has the
power to shape the historical events that form the basis for termination.73
The effects of this resource disparity are exacerbated by the increasing
complexity of the laws governing the child welfare system along with the collateral
consequences of decisions made in these cases.74 Federal and state laws, court rules,
administrative regulations, agency policies, and informal practices govern child
welfare cases. While federal statutes define the broad, uniform contours of how child
welfare systems must operate, state statutes vary significantly in the legal standards,
burdens of proof, and the legal obligations of child welfare agencies and the courts.75
Additionally, federal and state court decisions interpret the complicated statutory
scheme. Given the complexity of these laws, the National Association of Counsel
for Children offers a certification for lawyers who specialize in the field, which has
been recognized by the American Bar Association.76 Any belief that an

71 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 23, at 5 (“State intervention in the lives of
families . . . is a traumatic experience for children and parents alike.”).
72 Id. at 5 (“A parent . . . may not fully understand how the child welfare system works, the relevant laws
and his or her legal rights.”).
73 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
74 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 23, at 3 (noting the complexity of legal
proceedings in child welfare cases as a reason why parents need competent legal counsel).
75 See Haralambie & Duquette, supra note 32, at 421 (noting that “[a] child in foster care is affected by a
myriad of decisions established by federal and state laws designed to help the child” and that “[l]aws vary across
states.”).
76 More information about the certification program can be found at NACC CERTIFICATION,
http://www.naccchildlaw.org/?page=certification (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
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unrepresented—or poorly represented—litigant can effectively navigate this system
is misplaced.
Not only is the child welfare system complex, the costs of failing to effectively
navigate the system are high. Parents can temporarily lose custody of their children
in child protective cases and can also have their rights permanently terminated.
Additionally, findings in one case may be used to justify both the temporary and
permanent removal of another child from the family.77 And as a result of the case,
names of parents may be placed permanently on administrative registries, which can
bar parents from getting certain jobs or participating in events with children, and
parents may face related criminal or civil cases.78 A finding of maltreatment in a
child protective case may also affect the parent’s ability to retain their housing or
public benefits, which hinge on children remaining in the parent’s care.
Thus, at a minimum, adequate parent representation is needed to protect our
sense of justice and fairness in the child protective system.79 Can we possibly
describe our system as being fair when the State, with its sizeable resources at its
disposal, brings a case against a parent, who may not have the acumen to navigate a
complicated system on his or her own? And can we do so when decisions made in
the system carry significant collateral consequences? To preserve our sense of
fairness, public systems must invest in attorneys to represent parents.80
The lack of fairness created by the inadequate representation of parents impedes
the system’s goals of reunifying children with their families, which hinges on its
ability to engage and work with parents. Repeated studies by social psychologists in
the field of procedural justice provide compelling evidence that a key determinant in
whether litigants are willing to engage with court systems is using fair procedures to
make decisions.81 Surprisingly, although an individual’s willingness to accept

77 The doctrine of anticipatory or predictive neglect is well-established in child welfare cases. See, e.g.,
In re Arthur H., 819 N.E.2d 734, 749 (Ill. 2004) (“Under the anticipatory neglect theory, the State seeks to
protect not only children who are the direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability
to be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has
been found to have neglected or abused another child.”); In re Powers, 528 N.W.2d 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(“[A]nticipatory neglect guarantees the protection of a child who is not yet born, i.e., because of the past conduct
of another person, there is good reason to fear that the second child, when born, will also be neglected or
abused.”).
78 See Ann Haralambie et al., Collateral Proceedings in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 550–51
(3d ed. 2016) (describing registries created by states listing those substantiated of child abuse or neglect).
79 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 23, at 2, 14 (“The U.S. legal system is based on
the premise that parties have a due process right to be heard and that competent legal representation and fair
treatment produce just results . . . . Providing high quality legal representation . . . at all stages of dependency
proceedings is crucial to realizing these basic tenets of fairness and due process under the law.”).
80 A small study in Mississippi found that parents who had an attorney felt like the system was fairer
because they had a greater voice in determining outcomes, and that they understood the court process better
compared to those without attorneys. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
EXPLORING OUTCOMES RELATED TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS INVOLVED IN MISSISSIPPI’S
JUVENILE
DEPENDENCY
SYSTEM,
PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS,
(2013)
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/244704.pdf.
81 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH
POLICE AND COURTS 51, 93 (2002) [hereinafter TRUST IN THE LAW]; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 115, 129, 137 (1990) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW]; E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 71 (1988) [hereinafter SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
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authorities’ decisions is shaped by the favorability of outcomes, research shows that
outcome favorability is not the only, or even a major, factor shaping acceptance and
satisfaction.82 Both trust in the motives of authorities and judgments about the
fairness of procedures they use are stronger influences on acceptance and satisfaction
than achieving a particular outcome in a case.83
In assessing what is fair, litigants look to a number of factors. Most importantly,
procedures that permit individuals to present arguments and exert control over the
process are deemed just, whereas those that silence litigants only exacerbate feelings
of mistrust.84 Central to these findings is a person’s need to have his story told,
regardless of whether the telling will ultimately impact the outcome of the case.85
Fairness is also enhanced by adequate legal representation and confidence that the
decision-maker is neutral and unbiased.86 Courts that reaffirm one’s self-respect and
treat people politely while respecting their rights earn the trust of those before it,
regardless of the substance of the orders it issues.87
Why is the satisfaction of litigants important? Research demonstrates that
greater satisfaction in the process significantly increases the likelihood that litigants
will comply with the mandates of authorities, even when those authorities are taking
actions that may be detrimental to the interests of those individuals.88 This result is
particularly salient in child protective cases in which a finding of neglect only
represents the beginning of the case, and the ultimate outcome depends largely on the
willingness of the parent to work with the court and child welfare agency.89 Parents
must comply with case service plans and court orders to effectuate the child’s return
home. A parent’s satisfaction with the court process only helps child welfare
authorities work with that parent. Thus, the justice concerns raised by the absence of
adequate counsel directly hinders the system’s ability to work with parents.
Inadequate parent representation also harms children and wastes scarce public
funds. Research studies have shown that poor legal representation causes children to
needlessly enter and remain in foster care. Data from the Center for Family
JUSTICE]; Tom. R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal
Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 103, 104 (1988) [hereinafter What is Procedural Justice?].
82 See TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 81, at 26; WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 81, at 116,
163.
83 See TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 81, at 26; WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 81, at 116,
163.
84 See Kees van den Bos et al., When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of Trust in Authority,
75 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1449 (1998); Gary B. Melton & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice in Family
Court: Does the Adversary Model Make Sense? in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 65
(Gary B. Melton ed., 1982).
85 See WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 81, at 116, 127.
86 Id. at 137; What is Procedural Justice?, supra note 81, at 105, 107; van den Bos et al., supra note 84,
at 1452.
87 See What is Procedural Justice?, supra note 81, at 129; WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 81,
at 138.
88 See TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 81, at 51; WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 81, at 163;
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 81, at 64; José B. Ashford, Comparing the Effects
of Judicial Versus Child Protective Service Relationships on Parental Attitudes in the Juvenile Dependency
Process, 16 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 582, 584 (2006), available at http://rsw.sagepub.com/
cgi/reprint/16/6/582.pdf; van den Bos et al., supra note 84, at 1449.
89 See Ashford, supra note 88, at 583–84.
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Representation in New York City revealed that effective parent representation
reduced the need for children to enter foster care by fifty percent.90 When children
whose parents were served by the Center entered foster care, their stay in foster care
was a little over five months, compared to a citywide average of nearly a year.91
Similarly, a 2011 study of the Parent Representation Project of the Washington
Office of Public Defense, which reviewed data for over 12,000 children in
Washington’s child welfare system, found that children served by the Project—as
opposed to a typical court-appointed counsel—had a higher rate of reunification,
adoption, and guardianship, and that children achieved those outcomes much more
quickly.92 This data accords with similar findings in Oregon,93 and California.94
Parents’ counsel achieve these goals by providing information and options to parents,
counseling them, investigating facts, and presenting arguments to courts.95
These studies—though limited—suggest that inadequate parent representation
leads to children unnecessarily spending time in foster care, which in turn wastes
scarce public funds. The Center for Family Representation estimated that over a tenyear period, its work generated over $130 million in public savings.96 Similarly, the
Washington State Parent Representation Project estimates that it saves the state and
federal governments over $10 million a year in out-of-home care and
guardianship/adoption subsidy costs. These savings are unsurprising given the high
costs of foster care. In New York City, it costs at least $30,000 a year to keep a child
in foster care.97 In contrast, it costs the Center for Family Representation
approximately $6,500 per family over the entire life of the case.98 An investment in
parent representation not only promotes good outcomes for children, it also makes
the best use of limited government funds.
The dissonance that exists in child welfare systems across the country is readily
apparent. While systems need adequate parent representation to instill a sense of
fairness in our systems (thereby getting parents to engage with them), prevent poor
outcomes for children, and avoid wasting public funds, systems have nevertheless
failed to ensure that every parent receives the assistance of an effective lawyer. In
fact, as detailed in Section I, most systems guarantee the exact opposite—that parents
90 See Thornton & Gwin, supra note 54, at 143.
91 CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, (2016), available at http://www.cfrny.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/CFR-at-a-Glance-June-2016.pdf
92 Mark E. Courtney, Jennifer L. Hook, & Matt Orne, Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced Parental
Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes for Children in Foster Care, 34 CHILD. YOUTH
SERV. REV. 1337 (2011), available at http://partnersforourchildren.org/resources/publications/evaluationimpact-enhanced-parental-legal-representation-timing-permanency.
93 OR. PUB. DEF. SERVS. COMM’N, PARENT CHILD REPRESENTATION PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 2014–
2015 (2015), available at https://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/PCRP_report_PDSC_Jan_2016.pdf.
94 DIANE NUNN ET AL., DRAFT PILOT PROGRAM AND COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL (2007), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/102607itemF.pdf.
95 See Sankaran et al., supra note 25 (discussing ways in which strong parent representation helps parents
and child welfare agencies).
96 Martin Guggenheim & Sue Jacobs, A New National Movement in Parent Representation, 47
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. AND POL’Y 35, 44–46 (2013).
97 CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, 2014 REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY (2014),
https://www.cfrny.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/12/Annual-Report-2014-FINAL.pdf.
98 Id.
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will not receive the assistance of a competent lawyer, thereby undermining
confidence in the process, harming children and spending money to unnecessarily
house kids in foster care.
In some jurisdictions in which the absolute right to counsel is not guaranteed by
statute, advocates have made some attempts to litigate the issue, asking courts to
recognize a due process right to counsel, both in TPR cases and at earlier stages.99
But those efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to Lassiter and its refusal to
recognize that the Constitution categorically affords indigent parents the right to
counsel. In at least five states—Nevada, Mississippi, Delaware, Montana and
Wyoming—appellate courts have relied on Lassiter to deny attempts to guarantee an
absolute right to counsel.100 For example, in In re N.D.O.,101 the Nevada Supreme
Court stated, “after Lassiter, no absolute right to counsel exists under the United
States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment in parental rights termination
proceedings.”102 Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds
County Department of Human Services,103 citing Lassiter, found that the
“appointment of counsel in termination proceedings, while wise, is not mandatory
and therefore should be determined by state courts on a case-by-case basis.”104 And
in In re CC v. Natrona City Department of Family Services, the Wyoming Supreme
Court, also referencing Lassiter, noted that because a “parent’s physical personal
liberty is not in jeopardy in a parental termination proceeding, appointment of counsel
is not required in all instances.”105
Unsurprisingly, efforts to persuade courts to recognize an absolute right to
counsel in earlier stages of the proceedings—without a statute authorizing that
right—have also been largely unsuccessful. Courts in at least five states—New
Hampshire, Texas, Minnesota, Montana, and Nebraska—have refused to find that the
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel immediately upon the child’s
removal from the home.106 In In re C.M., the New Hampshire Supreme Court
considered the question after the state legislature abolished the statutory right to
counsel for parents prior to the TPR hearing.107 The Court found that, despite the
absence of counsel, the statutory procedures were “facially sufficient to prevent the

99 While most state courts have rejected constitutional or statutory claims to expand the right to counsel
in child protective cases, a few have, relying on interpretations of their state constitutions. See, e.g., In re TM,
319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (requiring appointment of counsel in TPR proceedings); In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d
1158 (Ind. 2014) (mandating counsel in earlier child protective proceedings).
100 In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005); J.C.N.F. v. Stone Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 996 So. 2d
762 (Miss. 2008); Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002); BSC v. Natrona Cty. Dep’t of
Family Servs., 102 P.3d 890 (Wyo. 2004); In re A.B., 780 P.2d 622 (Mont. 1989)
101 In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 226 (Nev. 2005).
102 Id. at 226 (internal emphasis omitted).
103 K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 2000).
104 Id. at 911.
105 In re CC v. Natrona Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 102 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo. 2004).
106 See In re Welfare of Children of S.-L.C., No. A07-586, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1083 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2007); In re A.F.-C., 37 P.3d 724 (Mont. 2001); In re R.R., 475 N.W.2d 518 (Neb. 1991); In
re C.M., 48 A.3d 942 (N.H. 2012); Anderson v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., No. 14-9700985-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4664 (Tex. Ct. App. June 24, 1999).
107 In re C.M., 48 A.3d at 945.
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risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care
and custody of his or her children.”108
Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Texas Department of
Protective & Regulatory Services, noted that “[b]ecause appointment of counsel lies
within the discretion of the trial court under federal constitutional analysis and the
Texas Legislature has not prescribed a time frame in which a trial court must
appoint . . . counsel, we decline to impose a rigid time frame by which courts must
appoint trial counsel.”109 Consistent with these holdings, the Montana Supreme
Court, in In re A.F.-C. found that the appointment of counsel was not required but
instead was contingent “in view of all of the circumstances.”110
These cases exemplify how Lassiter has created an insurmountable roadblock to
use the courts to ensure that every parent has the assistance of adequate counsel
immediately upon the removal of his or her child. Even in states that guarantee
parents the statutory right to counsel at all stages, Lassiter’s effects can be felt. For
example, recently, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, citing Lassiter, found that in the
absence of a constitutional right to appointed counsel, parents did not have a right to
the effective assistance of counsel.111 In other words, while the Tennessee
Legislature had mandated that all parents have counsel, there was no legal
requirement that the lawyer actually had to be effective. The pernicious effects of
Lassiter are omnipresent.
Given that there is no reason to think the Supreme Court will revisit or overturn
Lassiter anytime soon,112 this roadblock will impede efforts to persuade appellate
courts to recognize a federal constitutional right to adequate parent representation
from the very outset of the child welfare case. Certainly, lawyers can rely on
provisions in state constitutions to try to strengthen parent representation, or can
pursue local legislative strategies, which in some jurisdictions have been somewhat
successful.113 But these efforts will be piecemeal and may exacerbate the
disuniformity that currently exists across the country. Whether a parent receives the
effective assistance of counsel to protect a fundamental constitutional right should
not depend on where he or she resides.

108 Id. at 948–49.
109 Anderson v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., No. 14-97-00985-CV, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4664 at *13 (Tex. Ct. App. June 24, 1999).
110 In re A.F.-C., 37 P.3d at 731.
111 In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016).
112 See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442, 448 (2011) (reaffirming Lassiter’s presumption that an
absolute right to counsel only exists where a litigant may lose his physical liberty and finding that the Due
Process Clause does not automatically require the appointment of counsel in civil contempt proceedings, even
if a litigant faces the possibility of being incarcerated).
113 Several states have taken notable steps to strengthen parent representation. For example, in Utah, its
Indigent Defense Commission included parent representation within the scope of its work. See UTAH INDIGENT
DEF. COMM’N, supra note 9. In Washington State, its legislature expanded its strong parent presentation
program to more counties. See WASH. STATE OFF. OF PUB. DEF., supra note 4. Additionally, the New
Hampshire legislature restored cuts to parent representation to ensure counsel at every child welfare proceeding.
See Todd Bookman, House Votes to Restore Lawyers in Child Abuse Cases, N.H.P.R. (March 6, 2013),
http://nhpr.org/post/house-votes-restore-lawyers-child-abuse-cases#stream/0.
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To create uniformity in the protection of the fundamental right to parent,
advocates will need to pursue creative, non-litigation strategies. One previously
unexplored avenue to do so is to use federal child welfare statutes to both require and
fund adequate parent representation. The final section explores this possibility.
III. FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE LAWS PROVIDE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO
REMEDY THE CRISIS IN PARENT REPRESENTATION
The federal government is uniquely situated to create a basic level of adequacy
in the representation of parents. Since the early 1970s, the federal government has
sought to ensure uniformity in the basic practices and procedures of child welfare
systems across the states. The government took these steps due to concerns that
children were needlessly entering and remaining in foster care, thereby harming their
overall wellbeing.114 Though the government’s authority to directly require states to
follow federal mandates in child welfare cases is limited due to federalism concerns,
the government circumvented this by tying federal foster care funding to the adoption
of specific procedures it deemed essential to a well-functioning child welfare system.
Take Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, for example, which constitutes the largest
federal child welfare program. To receive federal foster care funding under Title IVE, states must submit a plan for their child welfare system that contains numerous
elements, such as ensuring that reasonable efforts are made to prevent the removal of
a child,115 developing a case plan that outlines what a parent must do to reunify with
her child,116 and identifying a child’s relatives within thirty days of removal.117 Other
federal child welfare laws, such as the Child Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act,
require states to ensure that children in foster care receive the assistance of a guardian
ad litem,118 the creation of a system for reporting child abuse and neglect, and that a
registry be established to identify perpetrators of abuse and neglect.119 These are but
a few of the many requirements imposed by the federal government through its child
welfare statutes.
In exchange, states receive federal funding to support specific expenses of their
foster care system. Funding through Title IV-E of the Social Security Act constitutes
the bulk of this funding, and those funds—which are an uncapped entitlement—can
be used to support expenses including subsidies and lawyers120 for foster parents,
adoptive parents and guardians, training caseworkers and foster parents, and
administrative costs necessary for the proper administration of the child welfare

114 See STOLTZFUS, supra note 10, at 1 (describing federal goals of safety, permanence, and well-being
for children in foster care).
115 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
116 § 671(a)(16).
117 § 671(a)(29).
118 § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii).
119 § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xvi)(VI).
120 § 673(a)(6)(A); id. § 673(d)(1)(B)(iv).
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system.121 But funds under Title IV-E cannot be used to provide social services to
the child, the child’s family or foster family.122
To ensure that states are following federal child welfare laws, the government
has set up several enforcement mechanisms, most prominently in Title IV-E. For a
child to be eligible for federal funding, judges in individual cases must make certain
findings, such as finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal of
a child from her home.123 Additionally, the federal government conducts periodic
audits of child welfare agencies to ensure compliance with federal law. And every
few years, the government conducts more formal Child and Family Service Reviews,
which assess outcomes for children through detailed onsite review of a specified
number of case records in a given state and by measuring statewide performance
against certain national data indicators.124 States not in substantial conformity with
federal policy must develop and successfully implement a Program Improvement
Plan to avoid financial penalties.125
Many resources exist that detail how the federal government has sought to create
uniformity among state child welfare systems. This brief overview is intended to
make a basic point: within this framework, the federal government could immediately
ensure that all parents receive the assistance of adequate counsel at the very outset of
a child welfare case. It could do so by specifically including a provision within Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act that in order to receive funding under the Act, states
must provide indigent parents with the assistance of a lawyer at the first court hearing
in a child protective case. In exchange for doing so, it could make clear that funding
under Title IV-E was available to support the representation of parents.
Parent representations should be situated within Title IV-E—as opposed to other
federal child welfare legislation—for several reasons. First, Title IV-E represents the
bulk of the federal government’s child welfare spending and is an uncapped
entitlement, unlike other legislation like CAPTA which has very limited funding.126
Second, funds distributed under Title IV-E already reimburse states for providing
attorneys to child welfare agencies and individuals seeking to adopt or obtain a
guardianship over a child.127 Third, the law allows states to be reimbursed for
training parents’ lawyers. Situating parent representation within the other Title IVE requirements is not only consistent with its existing directives, it will also have the
biggest impact on child welfare systems given the significant funding it provides
states.
The question remains, however, whether doing so would serve the federal
government’s child welfare policy interests. In January 2017, the Administration for

121 See CAL. ADVOCATES FOR CHANGE, supra note 17, at 2–4 (listing federal funding streams supporting
child welfare); STOLTZFUS, supra note 10.
122 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c)(3) (2016).
123 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
124 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.31–1355.37 (2016) (for more information about the child and family services
review process).
125 §§ 1355.35–1355.36.
126 See CAL. ADVOCATES FOR CHANGE, supra note 17, at 2–4.
127 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 19; 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(6)(A) (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 673(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2012).
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Children and Families answered this question in a widely-distributed Information
Memorandum in which it implored state child welfare agencies and courts to
strengthen the representation of parents.128 In the memorandum, the Administration
“strongly encourage[d] all jurisdictions to provide legal representation to all parents
in all stages of child welfare proceedings.”129 The memorandum documented ways
in which strong legal representation furthered the system’s goals of increased party
engagement, improved case planning, expedited permanency, and cost savings to
state government.130 It concluded that “[t]he absence of legal representation . . . at
any stage of child welfare proceedings is a significant impediment to a wellfunctioning child welfare system.”131
The Administration’s position is unsurprising given the close link between parent
representation and the explicit goals of the Title IV-E program. To receive funding
under the program, a state’s plan must accomplish, among other things, the following
goals: 1) ensuring that children do not needlessly enter foster care; 2) expediting the
reunification of children with their families; 3) facilitating the placement of children
with relatives; and 4) hastening the permanency for children.132 As detailed in
Section II, research demonstrates that strong parent representation furthers each of
these policy goals. The Administration’s recognition that a child welfare system
cannot function without adequate parent representation was long overdue.
Persuading Congress to amend Title IV-E to both require and fund adequate
parent representation is a long-term goal, given the length of time any legislative
campaign takes. In the meantime, ACF can take two immediate steps to solidify the
federal government’s recognition of the importance of parent representation.
First, the Administration should revise its Child Welfare Policy Guide to make
clear that Title IV-E funds, under the current version of the statute and regulations,
can be used by state child welfare agencies to support parent representation. Both
the statute and the regulations allow the federal government to provide states with
funds to cover administrative costs “necessary for the proper and efficient
administration of the title IV-E plan.”133 Neither the statute nor the regulations
specifically define exactly what administrative costs states can recoup. But the
regulations specifically identify costs related to the “[p]reparation for and
participation in judicial determinations” as ones “necessary for the administration of
the foster care program” and thus recoverable from the federal government.134
ACF, however, has prevented states from seeking funds for parent representation
as administrative costs. In a policy created in 2004, the Administration summarily
stated that states could not recoup the costs of parent representation from the federal
government.135 In reaching its conclusion, however, it provided no analysis of the
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See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 23.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 2.
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STOLTZFUS, supra note 10, at 3.
45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c) (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(3) (2012).
45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c)(2)(ii) (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c) (2016).
See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 19.
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regulations or statutes governing Title IV-E. It simply stated that agencies could only
seek reimbursement of costs related to the representation of child welfare agencies.
Although this policy was not a formal regulation promulgated in accordance with the
Administrative Procedures Act, states have still followed it, refusing to seek Title IVE funding to support the representation of parents.
The Administration should change this, and could do so easily given that the
policy is not a formal regulation. As noted above, its own memorandum issued in
January 2017 identifies the myriad ways in which parent representation is essential
for the administration of a functioning foster care system. Without adequate parent
representation, the goals of federal child welfare policy are directly undermined:
children needlessly enter foster care, remain in foster care, and do not achieve
permanency in a timely manner. Unsurprisingly, in a 2012 federal review, every state
in the country failed to achieve substantial conformity on six of seven outcomes
related to their Title IV-E Plan.136 Many of these outcome measures, including
maintaining children in their homes, continuing familial relationships and expediting
permanency, are directly strengthened by parent representation.
Not only are new approaches necessary, they are possible under the law. Given
that the regulations governing Title IV-E recognize that costs related to preparing for
and participating in court hearings are permissible administrative costs, and given
that neither the statute nor the regulations prohibit agencies from using administrative
costs to support the representation of parents, ACF should encourage states to seek
funding for this purpose. Opening up Title IV-E funding to support parent
representation would infuse much needed funding to bolster the struggling parent
representation systems across the country.
Second, if Congress reauthorizes the child welfare waiver demonstration
program, ACF should explicitly encourage states to submit proposals focusing on
parent representation. In 1994, Congress authorized the Department of Health and
Human Services to approve a specific number of demonstration projects that gave
states a wide degree of flexibility in how they used their Title IV-E funds, so long as
the programs were cost-neutral, promoted the overall goals of the Title IV-E program,
and met other specific requirements.137 Since that time, over twenty states have
implemented waiver demonstration projects in a variety of areas, including intensive
services for parents with substance abuse disorders, providing expedited reunification
services, and giving families in-home services before a child is removed to keep
families intact.138
Materials describing the goals of the program identify the importance of
innovative programs to support parents. For example, a 2012 Information
Memorandum explains that “to achieve better outcomes for children who have
136 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEWS AGGREGATE REPORTS ROUND 2 (FISCAL YEARS 2007–2010) (2011),
available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/fcfsr_report.pdf.
137 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., LOG NO.
ACYF-CB-IM-12-05 at 2–3 (2012) for a comprehensive discussion of the Title IV-E Waiver Demonstration
Project.
138 See JAMES BELL ASSOCS., SUMMARY OF THE TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS
2–3 (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/waiver_summary_final_april2013.pdf.
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experienced maltreatment, it is essential to engage families. . . . As parents and
caregivers become better equipped to provide a safe, nurturing and healing
environment, permanency becomes far more likely and more sustainable.”139 But in
the twenty-five years the program has existed, a state has never submitted a
demonstration project centered on the representation of parents. Nor has ACF ever
identified parent representation as an area for states to focus on when submitting an
application for the program. Short of adopting a policy position that Title IV-E funds
can be used to support parent representation, at the very least, ACF should explicitly
encourage states to focus on parent representation when applying for demonstration
project waivers.
ACF’s 2017 information memorandum was an important first step in recognizing
the close link between strong parent representation and the federal government’s
child welfare policy goals. But it is essential that it follow the memorandum with
actionable steps. As described above, if ACF 1) works with Congress to amend Title
IV-E to require states to provide parents with counsel at the first court hearing and to
explicitly permit funds to be used to support parent representation; 2) makes clear
that under the current law, Title IV-E funding can be used to support parent
representation; and 3) encourages states to submit demonstration projects focusing
on parent representation, dramatic improvements will occur to strengthen parent
representation across the country and to close the gap in the disuniformity that
currently exists today.
CONCLUSION
Every day, parents lose temporary and permanent rights to direct the care of their
children without the assistance of an adequate attorney. This reality undermines our
sense of justice, harms children, and wastes scarce public funds. But, because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter, federal and state appellate courts are largely
powerless to remedy this crisis.
The Federal Government could—and should—take immediate steps to fix this.
Congress should amend Title IV-E of the Social Security Act to require states to
provide parents with the assistance of counsel at the first court hearing and should
make clear that funds under the Act can be used by states to support parent
representation. Until that happens, the Administration for Children and Families
should clarify that states can recoup costs related to parent representation as
administrative costs under Title IV-E and should encourage states to submit child
welfare demonstration projects if Congress reauthorizes the program. These steps
are a crucial next step to implementing the strong language in ACF’s 2017
information memorandum in which it highlighted why a functioning child welfare
system must provide strong parent representation.

139 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 137, at 7 (2012).

